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On the 20th anniversary of the Constitutive Act of the African Union
entering into force, Candice Moore re ects on the diplomacy, vision and
paradigm changes that brought it into being, and the differences between
then and the Union today.
Just over 20 years ago, something noteworthy occurred. In a very unusual
outcome for continental politics, African statesmen agreed to the creation of a
new continent-wide African institution to replace the Organisation of African
Unity (OAU), a body that had been known as a ‘Club of Dictators’. Under the
strong leadership of three African leaders, each with their own agenda, the
continent’s ruling class was ushered to a new understanding of continental
security and cooperation, even if only on paper. South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki,
Libya’s Muammar Ghadda  and Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo, through varying
degrees of deft diplomacy and, it must be said, money on Ghadda ’s part,
fashioned a new African organisation whose premises were starkly different
from its predecessor’s.
More generally, the  rst decade of the 21st century was an inspiring time in
continental politics. The new African Union (AU) was agreed to in August 1999.
The Constitutive Act that gives shape to the new worldview embraced by the
continent entered into force in 2001 – the same year the New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was established. The AU itself was launched in
Durban, South Africa, in 2002. In 2000, a striking document, the Conference on
Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation (CSSDCA) was accepted as part
of a Solemn Declaration by the OAU, which was heavily in uenced by former
Nigerian President Obasanjo and, in the words of the AU, ‘establish(ed) the
fundamental principles for the promotion of democracy and good governance on
the continent’.
This new approach started the shift towards a theoretical concern with human
security over state security at the continental level – important because it drew
the rough lines of what would be considered acceptable behaviour by states. It
also built in a place for civil society in assisting to manage human security issues
across the continent. Security came to be seen as indistinguishable from
development. With hindsight, we can see what a magical time it was for African
continental diplomacy. I am not suggesting that these leaders were without fault,
only that the period was noteworthy for its massive change in focus.
So, what went wrong? A few things. National leadership changed within the key
African powers, which had an enormous impact on continental diplomacy. The
AU itself also rightfully subsumed within its work many of the famed and
extraordinary summits that were called during the time of the OAU. Next, the
global context changed, bringing in an era of greater austerity. Finally, the AU
itself struggled to keep pace with continental realities.
A change in leadership
Olusegun Obasanjo was replaced by Umaru Yar’Adua in May 2007 in an election
whose outcome was disputed. Although Yar’Adua was from the same political
party as Obasanjo, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), he did not continue
Obasanjo’s brand of continental diplomacy. In South Africa, Thabo Mbeki was
replaced as leader of the African National Congress at a party conference in
2008, which ended his style of foreign policy, although Africa remained central to
South Africa’s foreign policy concerns on paper. Mbeki, who was the subject of
much criticism for appearing to be a ‘foreign policy president’, had infused
continental diplomacy with energy and vision. But after his departure there
appeared to be an effort to undermine his work, as the new Zuma administration
sought to distance itself from it. Once these two leaders left o ce, the wind left
the sails of the grand continental projects that had animated the 2000s.
The AU itself stepped into the breach. In 2012, another South African, Dr
Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, was elected Chair of the AU Commission, the body’s
secretariat. The Commission was tasked with developing a new continental
development plan: Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want.
Here we did not see individual state leaders coming forward with plans, as
Agenda 2063 was developed by the bureaucracy of the African Union
Commission. This affects the way in which a plan is promoted and supported. If
it is developed by a bureaucracy, there is less incentive by individuals to take
ownership of it and seek to build alliances to promote and support it. Recall the
international appearances by Mbeki, Obasanjo, Abdelaziz Boute ika of Algeria,
Alpha Oumar Konare of Mali, and others, before the G8 to promote  rst the New
African Initiative (NAI) and then NEPAD from 2001 onwards. That year a tradition
of an ‘African segment’ of G7/8 meetings was started by Italy. NAI itself was a
combination of a plan drawn up by Mbeki (Millennium Africa Recovery Plan,
MAP) and one drawn up by Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal (Omega Plan). We have
yet to see a repeat of this personalised form of leadership and vision in
continental diplomacy.
This is not to say that all diplomacy has withered. The African Continental Free
Trade Area (AfCFTA) entered into force on 30 May 2019, after only three years of
negotiations. While this sort of plan to deepen African economic and trade
integration has been decades in the making, it is some feat to have concluded
negotiations on an agreement and have the agreement enter into force within
this timeframe.
Africa and shifting geopolitics
The global context has also changed dramatically from the early 2000s. The by-
and-large unipolar order led by the United States at the time has given way to a
more multi-faceted order and competing powers. While this should create new
opportunities for support for Africa’s continental programmes, it also means that
this support is more diversi ed and possibly diluted to suit the individual political
needs of powerful states such as China or the US. For one, US aid became
increasingly militarised and tied to domestic political interests (such as Christian
fundamentalism) in the 2000s, leading to new priorities for the country in Africa.
Tony Blair’s (and his successor Gordon Brown’s) ‘scar on the conscience of
humanity’ approach to Africa also gave way to a more pragmatic approach under
the Conservative David Cameron. Barack Obama, in spite of his Kenyan heritage
which some thought would enhance his engagement with Africa, did not preside
over signi cant Africa-centric policies. The arrival of Donald Trump on the scene
in 2016 only cemented Africa’s role once again as a commodity and, in short, the
audience for Africa’s development initiatives by and large dissipated.
The African context itself became less hospitable to grand continental visions, as
a number of dormant con icts bubbled over once more (such as the RENAMO
insurgency in Mozambique) and new con icts erupted, not least the Arab Spring
that ushered in the second decade of the 21st century. In particular, the fallout of
Ghada ’s departure is still being felt in Libya and beyond. Few have questioned,
as Paul D Williams, George Washington University expert has, the  nancial
implications for the AU and its continental diplomacy of Libya’s fracture. The
contribution made by Ghadda ’s Libya was sizeable, estimated at some 20-25%
of the AU’s budget, including paying the assessed contributions of a few smaller
countries. Ghada  could host summits, such as the 1999 OAU Sirte Summit, at
the drop of a hat, and while this function is now within the purview of the AU, the
ability to perform such grand strokes must surely be missed.
Political will now and then
Finally, the ambitious dreams of the AU have been constrained by simple
realities: a lack of political will and lack of capacity. This brings the achievements
of those authors of the new African Union in 2002 neatly into perspective. The
support required to do away with the OAU in favour of a new institution that
appeared to undermine one of the central tenets of the OAU – non-intervention –
was phenomenal. Even leaders such as Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni and
Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe were brought along in spite of their misgivings and
reservations. Political will was required to bring the AU into existence and this
was available in su cient quantities at the time.
All the while, the AU itself remains a paradoxical prisoner of its own creators.
While it has achieved a striking number of the objectives set out in the
Constitutive Act of 2001, some of the loftier goals remain out of reach. Next year,
in 2022, 20 years on from the launch of the AU, the record of the organisation can
be examined. Now is the time, however, to re ect on the Constitutive Act and the
elevated ambition and visionary, gritty diplomacy that brought it into being.
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